Introduction
While there are numerous variations on the definition of humanitarian intervention, this concept is largely seen as the acceptable use of military force, specifically military intervention against a state or organized group for the purpose of ending human rights abuses (Nardin & Williams, 2006). This definition, while excluding non-military interventions, explicitly identifies protecting civilian rights and interests as the legitimate and morally acceptable reason for involving armed resistance. It is this definition that the current paper relies on. To augment this position, the paper starts with a brief historyofn humanitarian intervention. Further, the paper highlights a few theories that will aid in putting Libya’s case in perspective. A brief description of Libya’s civil war and the multiplicity of factors surrounding the involvement of NATO will also be highlighted. All these have been synthesised and analysed vis-à-vis the reality on the ground and have helped in calling NATO’s actions in Libya a failure.
Humanitarian Intervention – a Brief History
To increase the understanding of what humanitarian intervention means, it is important to mention in passing its origin. This concept can be traced back to the 17th century European politics, and from that time, this subject has remained the mainstay in foreign policy matters (Simms & Trim, 2013). After NATO’s interference in Kosovo in the late 1990s, humanitarian intervention activists identify conflict between the principle of sovereignty, which is a key pillar of the UN system as well as international law, and ever-changing international ethics on human rights, and the use of force to quell conflicts (Heinze, 2009). Furthermore, it has ignited normative and practical arguments over its validity, legality, the morality of expending military resources in reply to human rights abuses, if and when it ought to occur, who should interfere, and finally, its effectiveness (Simonen, 2011).
HumanitarianInterventionn - Relevant Theories
To make a good case for this argument, it is important to mention some theoretical underpinnings. Neoclassical realism is one such theory, and as presented by Hans J. Morgenthau, man has an inherent need to increase his power to control others (Nardin & Williams, 2006). Nardin and Williams further argue that such a power-seeking nature of man generates a condition in which national leaders tussle for power over other nations (2006). Since international politics is a game of power struggles, Morgenthau argues that the methods of obtaining, preserving, and validating power lead to cross-national feuds. Since nations are constantly concerned about preserving security, political, economic, and territorial sovereignty, interventionism becomes an option in pursuit of this (Simonen, 2011).
As opposed to neoclassical realism,m which underscores human nature, neorealism theory emphasises the existence anarchical international system where a weak central authority is in charge of international politics. A self-help international system in which a country’s foreign policy is only concerned with a state’s national welfare appears to determine how states relate with each other. Therefore, nations unceasingly seek to secure their welfare and general survival through the self-help system. Thus, preservation of national interests can be through reinforcement of a nation’s power or sometimes through military action (Valls, 2000).
In contrast to neo-realists and neoclassical theories, liberalism focuses on the safeguarding of basic human rights through military intervention. Each state pursues national gains, and liberalists believe that, due to shared interests,s cooperation among states is possible. This is the reason why the United Nations exists (Kuperman & Crawford, 2014). Contemporary liberal internationalism appears to make a valid Humanitarian Intervention as a last resort and must be exercised multilaterally in strict protection of civilian rights (Valls, 2000). It therefore appears that the liberalist theory is the only one that marries the definition of humanitarian intervention given herein.
Libyan Humanitarian Crisis – The Genesis
Libya’s history of coup d’état can be traced to the coming into power of its political and military supremo, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, i in a bloodlesoverthrowrn the of the government in 1969. Col. Gaddafi’s reign was characterised by massive economic growth such that Libya’s annual GDP rose to US$11,000, an economic success by 3rd World Standards. Yet, many controversies surrounding domestic political repression and strange foreign policy earned Col. Gaddafi enemies both at home and abroad (O'Sullivan, 2017).
At the beginning of 2011, the effects of the Arabs Spring were felt in Libya after a civil war broke out. Anti-Gaddafi forces, backed by external forces, formed the National Transitional Council, a committee meant to act as aatemporary government in all the areas controlled by Gaddafi's forces. Col. Gaddafi’s government reacted by repressing, resultingino massive human rights abuses by both sides. In response, an international coalition of military forces coalesced under NATO and started military intervention in March of the same year, apparently to defend civilians mostly against the violation of their rights bythe government's forces. This followed a warrant of arrest by the International Criminal Court against Col. Gaddafi and several of lieutenants. With the help of rebel forces, NATO ousted Col. Gaddafi in August 2011 (United States, 2011). While the threshold of Universal acceptance of the principle of responsibility to protect was severed UN authorised no-fly zone in Libya that led to the ultimate fall of Col. Gaddafi and the escalation of domestic rebellion, continued atrocities by rebels groups, massive economic decline and continued political repression by the post Gaddafi authorities, debate has raged on whether humanitarian Intervention by NATO led forces was a success or not.
NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention – the real reasons
According to O'Sullivan, the real causes of NATO’s interventionism can be categorised into three (2017). To begin with, the West was concerned with Col. Gaddafi’s rising influence both locally, regionally, continentally, and globally. In the words of the then US President Barack Obama, it was impossible to continue to watch a tyrant reign terror on innocent civilians, thoughts that were echoedby the then French leader Nicholas Sarkozy. Following widespread acceptance by world powerful nations on the need to involve military intervention to safeguard civilian interests, the UN Security Council authorised NATO’s involvement in Libya (Weiss, 2016).
However, as argued by McKinne,y NATO intervention can be termed as an illegal war since it was basically fuelled by national rather than civilian interests inside Libya (2012). The USA and major European states wanted the preservation of Libya’s oil reserves for their own benefit. Because civilian conflict significantly affected the production of oil, it was therefore important that Western forces unite and end the conflict to restore oil production.
Secondly, Gaddafi’s history as a sympathiser and funder of terror gangs and networks was a cause of major concern. This led to the listing of Libya as among the nations that were aiding terrorism. Even though Gaddafi dissociated with any terrorist organisation in the late 1990’s, the potential security threat that his association with terrorists posed worriedWesternn states (United States, 2011). Thus, they wanted a regime change.
Thirdly, Gaddafi’s development and eventual use of chemical weapons posed a major regional, continental, and intercontinental security threat. In the 1980s, Gaddafi employed chemical weaponry against Chad, a move that portrayed Libya’s war ambitions. Her pursuant to the acquisition and use of other weapons that had the potential for mass destruction – biological and nuclear- worried the US and otheWesternrn countries (United States, 2011). Since Gaddafi was normally considered a rather irrational player in world politics, his control of weapons posed a serious security threat to European nations. Therefore, the welfare of NATO allies, which included military, political, and economic security were superior driving force for NATO’s intervention in Libya (McKinney, 2012). Thus, realism, as opposed to liberalism, appears to explain thisphenomenona.
Why Humanitarian Intervention in Libya is a Failure
As mentioned before, the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention is subjected rigorous debate on its legitimacy, legality, ethics, ty as well as effectiveness since it is primarily seen as a cause to protect abuse of civilians (Tesón, 2005). While some critics see NATO’s actions in Libya as exceedingly successful, further evaluation of its long-term significance portends an overwhelmingly negative outlook. This is because Libya’s case is unique and portends serious questions due to the multiplicity of factors that fuelled it. These factors shall be evaluated herein after vis-à-vis the theoretical underpinnings that inform actions of humanitarian intervention.
Some hold that NATO’s intervention in Libya was a resounding success regardless of the aftermath chaos that has been experienced. The first claim on the success of this project was NATO’s ability to stem Col. Gaddafi’s abuse of power. Supporters of this view claim that the genocide type activities that were overseen by the ruling regime in the City of Sirte, where it is claimed that 30,000 civilians died, are dwarfed by the possible happenings that would have occurred had he successfully overrun the larger city of Benghazi (O'sullivan, 2017). While it is almost impossible to approve of disprove this argument, historical facts lend support to it. Most of the Arab dictators have suppressed possible uprisings using brute force, leading to thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of civilian deaths. This seems to have been a preventative measure against wider human rights abuses. It is claimed that Col. Gaddafi’s forces might have killed up to 8000 before NATO vanquished him (Kuperman & Hehir, 2013).
Another reason given for the success of NATO’s actions in Libya is the argument that the killings credited to the rebel forces in the city of Sirte portended the weaknesses of the central regime, which was characterised by wanton indiscipline and incapacity to run domestic programs effectively. This argument is supported by the claims that NTC, the conglomerate of insurgents fighting Col. Gaddafi, prevailed upon their fighters and supporters not to loot as well as stop revenge attacks (Kuperman & Hehir, 2013). Thus, it appears that NTC rebels and their sympathisers were more interested in protecting basic human rights than the central regime.
Lastly, there were possibilities that, under a new government, reliable reports of severe human rights abuses would have been properly probed and anybody found culpable held responsible. Since the new leadership would have had the full backing of the UN Security Council, it is possible that NTC’s leadership would have been under strict scrutiny from the international community (O'sullivan, 2017). This would have reduced human rights abuses.
The above reasons fail to meet the moral threshold of legitimacy due to a number of factors, as they are mostly presumptive. The reality is quite the opposite and shall be described herein after. The ghastly killing of Col. Gaddafi and his generals wassimilarlyn to the same kind of atrocities that NATO was meant to end (Kuperman & Hehir, 2013). Saying that Col. Gaddafi and his generals deserved a gruesome death betrays the same ethical relativism that interventionists usually assign to their adversaries. The law on International humanitarian intervention is universal. Its existence isin line with the need to protect the rights of all. This includes the rights and liberties of those who abuse it (Coyne, 2013). Thus, NATO’s actions in Libya, when viewed against liberal theory, weaken the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions.
The rapid militarization of the anti-government uprising, the support by NATO, andthe successive descent into armed struggle led to the UN authorizing the interference, which was explicitly stated as purely for the safeguarding of civilians. Yet, the overriding biases by the coalition forces quickly became evident (O'Sullivan, 2017). Even though the rebellion appeared to cause death among civilians, coalition forces deliberately directed an array of attacks on forces loyal to the central regime as well as government facilities that didn’t pose a risk to civilians. It therefore appears that NATO and its allies were least interested in civilian welfare, which offends the liberalistic assertions on humanitarian intervention (Coyne, 2013). Instead, they wanted to incapacitate Col. Gaddafi’s regime.
In addition to this, several other factors show NATO’s interventionism in Libya was based on realism instead of liberalism. The lack of ceasefire efforts, attempts to reach a political solution, the supplying of state of the art weapons, cash, and military technical and tactical approach to the rebels revealed thatthe coalition’s major objective had nothing to do with ending human rights violations by both government forces and insurgents. Instead, NATO seemed to be preoccupied with the idea of supporting the local anti-Gaddafi movement.
Moreover, NATO, instead of ending deep-seated ethnic, religious, and political divisions in Libya, seemed to be an enabler (Coyne, 2013). After NATO’s military interventions that led to the death of Col. Gaddafi, the Sahel and Sahara region was destabilised to unprecedented levels. Criminal gangs and terror groups within this region attained substantial power, enhanced by military apparatus plundered from government stockpiles or gifted from coalition forces. Tens of armed guerrillas,s both Islamist and liberal, al fought to gain control of major government institutions, facilities,ies and strategic infrastructures. Central to these struggles were transport facilities and oil fields. Innocent civilians paid the heavy price as these gangs reigned terror on them. NATO’s activities seem to have exacerbated the ethnic and political fragmentation of Libyan society. Inadequate experience with democracy portends that militarizing the transition to democracy was impossible (Kuperman & Hehir, 2013). A politically mediated compromise would have been more successful.
Second, the immediate, hurried support unreservedly granted by Western forces to Libyan insurgent groups legitimised armed anti-government resistance. As such, other oppressed communities were encouraged by NATO’s support. This is even though civil disobedience and active but peaceful resistance have demonstrated significantly more chances of success in upsetting a dictatorship. Internationally backed violent rebellion is likely to cause extreme suffering to civilians and destruction of established systems since it is not based on democratic ideals (Coyne, 2013). Thus, such a humanitarian intervention based on the assertions made by realist theorists is likely to be counterproductive due to a lack of ability to support functioning democracies.
Indeed, violent groups that ascend to power tend not to be the most popular with civilians, since they intend to gain power as opposed to safeguard human rights. The use of armed resistance to seek resolutions for political problems has a high possibility of being institutionalized in the post war period (Coyne, 2013). This produces a regime that oppresses dissenting opinions, as it has been witnessed in Libya, where there is sustained violence among rebel groups who seek to gain as much power as possible. Instead, hadNATOs had civilians' interests at its core, it would have provided monetary, technical, and political support for non-violent campaigns (Kuperman & Hehir, 2013). Military intervention would only have come in handy to prevent abuse of human rights by both Col. Gaddafi’sforces as well as the insurgent forces.
Most importantly, NATO’s activity during the Libyan civil war led to a significant fragility to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (Hehir & Murray, 2013). This doctrine follows broad consultations on the needs, ethics, and modalities of humanitarian intervention. Organisations such asthe United Nations Security Council, the European Union, the Arab League, and the African Union, among others,s must veto humanitarian intervention (Heinze, 2009). However, Libya worsened the case for benevolent interventionism. Russia, anitser communist ally of China, opted out instead choosing to stick to the doctrine of non-interference as they felt cheated by the West to support a cause that portended no tangible benefit to them. Furthermore, there were concerns about high-handedness and the possibility of misapplication (O'Sullivan, 2017). In view of this, future implementation of this doctrine will face sustained antagonism as interested parties jostle for relevance.
Conclusion
Every single large-scale military interference comes laden with moral hazards, Libya being no exception. The debate on the legitimacy can take multiple dimensions with multiple, sometimes contradicting outcomes. Yet, when viewed against the definition used in this essay and on the evidence seen so far, NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya must be counted as a failed mission.
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